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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Noreen Susinno appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing her Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) 
claim against Work Out World Inc. for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Because the TCPA provides Susinno with a 
cause of action, and her alleged injury is concrete, we will 
reverse the order of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings. 
I 
Susinno alleged that on July 28, 2015, she received an 
unsolicited call on her cell phone from a fitness company 
called Work Out World (WOW). Susinno did not answer the 
 4 
 
call, so WOW left a prerecorded promotional offer that lasted 
one minute on her voicemail.  
Susinno filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey claiming WOW’s phone 
call and message violated the TCPA’s prohibition of 
prerecorded calls to cellular telephones, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). WOW moved to dismiss Susinno’s 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The District Court granted WOW’s motion to dismiss. 
Its decision was based on two conclusions: (1) a single 
solicitation was not “the type of case that Congress was trying 
to protect people against,” App. 38, and (2) Susinno’s receipt 
of the call and voicemail caused her no concrete injury. 
Susinno filed this timely appeal.  
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
 Our review of an order dismissing a complaint for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary, McCann v. Newman 
Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006), as is our 
review of questions of statutory interpretation, United States 
v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130, 132 (3d Cir. 2004). “To survive a 
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (citation omitted). 
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III  
 This appeal poses two distinct questions: Does the 
TCPA prohibit the conduct alleged by Susinno? And if it 
does, is the harm alleged sufficiently concrete for Susinno to 
have standing to sue under Article III of the United States 
Constitution?  
A 
 The TCPA provides consumers with a private right of 
action for certain prohibited uses of automated telephone 
equipment. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). WOW argues that the 
TCPA does not prohibit a single prerecorded call to a cell 
phone if the phone’s owner was not charged for the call. 
Susinno claims that it does.  
“As in all cases of statutory interpretation, our inquiry 
begins with the language of the statute and focuses on 
Congress’ intent.” United States v. Abbott, 574 F.3d 203, 206 
(3d Cir. 2009). The relevant text of the TCPA reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person within the 
United States . . .  
(A) to make any call (other than a call 
made for emergency purposes or made 
with the prior express consent of the called 
party) using any automatic telephone 
dialing system or an artificial or 
prerecorded voice . . . 
(iii) to any telephone number 
assigned to a paging service, 
cellular telephone service, 
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specialized mobile radio 
service, or other radio 
common carrier service, or 
any service for which the 
called party is charged for the 
call . . . . 
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).  
 WOW argues that the structure of this provision limits 
the scope of “cellular telephone service” to cell phone 
services where “the called party is charged for the call.” 
WOW Br. 15 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 
227(b)(1)(A)(iii)). According to WOW, when Congress 
prohibited prerecorded calls to cell phones in the TCPA, it 
primarily was concerned with the cost of those calls. See 
WOW Br. 2, 4–5 (quoting the House and Senate reports for 
the TCPA).  
 WOW’s reading of section 227(b)(1) is strained. As 
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained: 
“[t]he rule of the last antecedent requires the phrase ‘for 
which the called party is charged for the call,’ [in § 
227(b)(1)], ‘to be applied to the words or phrase immediately 
preceding (i.e. “any service”), and not to be construed as 
extending to or including others more remote.’” Osorio v. 
State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1257 (11th Cir. 
2014) (citation and alterations omitted).  
 But even apart from the grammatical analysis, we 
think another provision of the TCPA decisively rebuts 
WOW’s reading of the statute. Section 227(b)(2)(C) provides 
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC): 
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may, by rule or order, exempt from the 
requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this 
subsection calls to a telephone number assigned 
to a cellular telephone service that are not 
charged to the called party, subject to such 
conditions as the Commission may prescribe as 
necessary in the interest of the privacy rights 
this section is intended to protect.  
If it were the case (as WOW suggests) that cell phone calls 
not charged to the recipient were not covered by the general 
prohibition, there would have been no need for Congress to 
grant the FCC discretion to exempt some of those calls. We 
also think it significant that this section states “calls to a [cell 
phone] . . . not charged to the called party” can implicate 
“privacy rights” that Congress “intended to protect,” even if 
the phone’s owner is not charged for the call. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(b)(2)(C). 
 WOW notes that the statute’s congressional findings 
refer to “residential telemarketing practices” and “calls to the 
home.” See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. 102–243, § 2, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991). Although it is 
true that the TCPA placed particular emphasis on intrusions 
upon the privacy of the home in 1991, this expression of 
particular concern for residential calls does not limit—either 
expressly or by implication—the statute’s application to cell 
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phone calls. Accordingly, the TCPA provides Susinno a cause 
of action for the conduct she alleged.1  
B 
1 
We turn next to the question of whether Susinno has 
alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to establish 
constitutional standing to sue. This issue implicates the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). There, the Court considered Thomas 
Robins’s claim that Spokeo, the “people search engine,” 
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by 
disseminating inaccurate information about his 
creditworthiness. 136 S. Ct. at 1544. Spokeo stated 
inaccurately that Robins “is married, has children, is in his 
50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent, and holds a graduate 
degree.” Id. at 1546. Although these inaccuracies did not have 
an obvious negative effect on Robins’s creditworthiness, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an 
                                                 
 1 Amicus ACA International argues that to impose 
liability under § 227(b)(1) where the cell phone’s owner isn’t 
charged for the call constitutes a violation of due process. 
This argument was not raised by WOW, and even if it had 
been, we would not find the TCPA void for vagueness where, 
as here, it neither “fails to provide people of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct it prohibits,” nor “authorizes or even encourages 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. 
Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
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individualized violation of a statutory right always constitutes 
an injury sufficient to confer standing. Id. 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Ninth 
Circuit, clarifying that “Article III standing requires a 
concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” 
Id. at 1549. Significantly for this appeal, the Court also noted 
that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.” Id. To 
determine whether an intangible injury is concrete, the Court 
explained that “both history and the judgment of Congress 
play important roles.” Id. As for the historical inquiry, “it is 
instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has 
a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been 
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts.” Id. The Supreme Court also recognized 
that Congress may elevate certain intangible harms “to the 
status of legally cognizable injuries,” even if those injuries 
“were previously inadequate in law.” Id. (citation omitted); 
see also id. (explaining that “because Congress is well 
positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum 
Article III requirements, its judgment is also instructive and 
important,” but that this “does not mean that a plaintiff 
automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement 
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right”).  
 In In re Horizon Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach 
Litigation, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017), we applied Spokeo to 
a claim for inadequate protection of personal information in 
violation of the FCRA. Despite no allegation “that the 
information was actually used to [the plaintiffs’] detriment,” 
we held that “[i]n light of the congressional decision to create 
a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal 
information, a violation of [the] FCRA gives rise to an injury 
sufficient for Article III standing purposes.” Id. at 629.  
 10 
 
 While we recognized that Spokeo teaches that “there 
are some circumstances where the mere technical violation of 
a procedural requirement of a statute cannot, in and of itself, 
constitute an injury in fact,” we found “no occasion to 
consider” the “limiting circumstances . . . not defined in 
Spokeo.” Id. at 638. We reached this conclusion for two 
reasons. First, plaintiffs in Horizon alleged “the very injury 
that [the] FCRA is intended to prevent.” Id. at 640. Second, 
“the ‘intangible harm’ that [the] FCRA seeks to remedy ‘has 
a close relationship to a harm [i.e. invasion of privacy] that 
has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a 
lawsuit in English or American courts.’” Id. at 639–40 
(alterations in original) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).2 
This close relationship existed even though the conduct 
alleged would not have “give[n] rise to a cause of action 
under common law.” Id. at 639.  
2 
 We summarize Horizon’s rule as follows. When one 
sues under a statute alleging “the very injury [the statute] is 
intended to prevent,” and the injury “has a close relationship 
to a harm . . . traditionally . . . providing a basis for a lawsuit 
in English or American courts,” a concrete injury has been 
pleaded. Id. at 639–40. We do not, and need not, conclude 
                                                 
2 Horizon thus forecloses the argument by amicus 
Chamber of Commerce that Spokeo disallows any “claim 
based on privacy concerns” on the grounds that only “harms 
recognized at the time of the founding [are] sufficient to 
support a lawsuit.” Chamber Br. 13–14 (emphasis in 
original).  
 
 11 
 
that intangible injuries falling short of this standard are never 
concrete. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638 (declining to 
determine minimum standard of concreteness where 
unnecessary to decide case). Rather, we simply observe that 
all intangible injuries that meet this standard are concrete. 
 Applying Horizon’s standard to the facts of this 
appeal, we conclude that the injuries alleged by Susinno are 
concrete for two reasons.  
 First, Congress squarely identified this injury. The 
TCPA addresses itself directly to single prerecorded calls 
from cell phones, and states that its prohibition acts “in the 
interest of [ ] privacy rights.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(C). The 
congressional findings in support of the TCPA likewise refer 
to complaints that “automated or prerecorded telephone calls 
are a nuisance [and] . . . an invasion of privacy.” Pub. L. 102–
243, § 2. We therefore agree with Susinno that in asserting 
“nuisance and invasion of privacy” resulting from a single 
prerecorded telephone call, her complaint asserts “the very 
harm that Congress sought to prevent,” arising from 
prototypical conduct proscribed by the TCPA. App. 11 (First 
Amended Complaint); see also Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness 
Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding two 
unwanted text messages constituted a concrete injury under 
the TCPA, as they “present the precise harm and infringe the 
same privacy interests Congress sought to protect”).  
 Having determined that the amended complaint 
pleaded an injury Congress aimed to prevent, we turn next to 
the historical inquiry. We think Susinno has satisfied this test 
as well. As we said in Horizon, a close relationship does not 
require that the newly proscribed conduct would “give rise to 
a cause of action under common law.” 846 F.3d at 639. But it 
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does require that newly established causes of action protect 
essentially the same interests that traditional causes of action 
sought to protect. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
has opined that TCPA claims closely relate to traditional 
claims for “invasions of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, 
and nuisance [which] have long been heard by American 
courts.” Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. In our view, intrusion 
upon seclusion best fits the facts of this case.  
 Traditionally, a plaintiff’s “privacy is invaded” for the 
purpose of an intrusion upon seclusion claim by telephone 
calls “only when [such] calls are repeated with such 
persistence and frequency as to amount to . . . hounding.” 
Intrusion upon Seclusion, Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 652B, cmt d (1977). The Second Restatement suggests that 
because “two or three” calls would not be “highly offensive 
to the ordinary reasonable [person],” they traditionally would 
provide no cause of action. Id. Yet when Congress found that 
“[u]nsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by 
their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of 
their recipients,” Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043, it sought to 
protect the same interests implicated in the traditional 
common law cause of action.3 Put differently, Congress was 
                                                 
3 We agree with the Chamber of Commerce that a 
party does not satisfy the concreteness analysis “simply by 
appending the word ‘privacy’ to her allegation.” Chamber Br. 
14. But intrusion upon seclusion is a well-recognized subset 
of common law invasion of privacy. See Wilcher v. City of 
Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 379 (3d Cir. 1998); W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, 
p. 854–55 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing “unreasonable and 
highly offensive intrusion upon the seclusion of another” as 
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not inventing a new theory of injury when it enacted the 
TCPA. Rather, it elevated a harm that, while “previously 
inadequate in law,” was of the same character of previously 
existing “legally cognizable injuries.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1549. Spokeo addressed, and approved, such a choice by 
Congress.  
 For these reasons, we hold that Susinno has alleged a 
concrete, albeit intangible, harm under the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Spokeo and our decision in Horizon. Because we 
so hold, we need not address her additional arguments that 
her various tangible injuries provide alternative grounds for 
standing.4  
* * * 
 “[C]ourts benefit from straightforward rules under 
which they can readily assure themselves of their power to 
hear a case.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). 
                                                                                                             
“consist[ing] of intentional interference with another’s 
interest in solitude or seclusion,” including “persistent and 
unwanted telephone calls” (footnote omitted)). 
 
4 Nor do we need to resolve the issue, not fully briefed 
by the parties, of whether wasted time is a tangible or 
intangible harm. Compare A.D. v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 
2016 WL 4417077, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2016) (“tangible 
harms” in TCPA context may include “wasted time”) with 
Mey v. Got Warranty, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 641, 648 (N.D. 
W. Va. 2016) (“final intangible harm” caused by unwanted 
calls included “wast[ing] the plaintiff’s time”).  
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Our opinion today repeats our “understand[ing] that the 
Spokeo Court meant to reiterate traditional notions of 
standing.” Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638. And the traditional 
notion of standing “requir[es] only that claimant allege some 
specific, identifiable trifle of injury.” Blunt v. Lower Merion 
School Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (alterations 
and citations omitted). Where a plaintiff’s intangible injury 
has been made legally cognizable through the democratic 
process, and the injury closely relates to a cause of action 
traditionally recognized in English and American courts, 
standing to sue exists.  
Consistent with this legal standard, we hold that the 
TCPA provides Susinno with a cause of action, and that her 
injury satisfies the concreteness requirement for constitutional 
standing. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
order dismissing her case and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
